Although Beijing is irritated by its neighbour's nuclear test, the fear of instability is real. The next few days will be critical
North Korea's dramatic and provocative announcement of its third nuclear test on 12 February has raised critical questions about the effectiveness of the international community in reining in north-east Asia's most unruly actor. The key player in persuading North Korea to adopt a more moderate course of action is China. As a longstanding political and strategic ally and a provider of substantial amounts of energy and food assistance, and given its geographical proximity, Beijing has the means and increasingly the incentive to put pressure on Pyongyang to row back from its belligerent posture.
Judging from Beijing's critical rhetorical response to this week's events, China's leaders appear minded to get tough with North Korea. China's foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, quickly announced that his government was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed to the test", and took a symbolically important step in calling in the North Korean ambassador to China to underline this message. Beijing was also careful to identify itself with a UN security council statement that "strongly condemned" the nuclear test.
There is little doubt that irritation in China at the provocations from its Korean neighbour has been increasing – not only in government circles, but also among academic commentators and within wider social media and online communities. But it remains unclear whether Beijing is willing to reinforce its rhetoric by imposing significant pain on the North Korean leadership.
Militating against action is the Chinese leadership's fear of instability: the desire not to destabilise the fledgling regime of Kim Jong-un for fear that this might provoke a North Korean collapse, triggering an exodus of refugees across China's 800-mile border; creating a power vacuum that could be filled by South Korea and its American ally; and posing a proximate strategic challenge to China's security.
Inaction, however, has real risks. If Beijing pulls its punches, it undermines its credibility internationally as a "responsible stakeholder" able to mediate constructively. For now, China has called for "calm and restraint" and suggested that the six-party talks be reactivated as a means of restarting negotiations with North Korea. But this proposal appears impractical at a time when domestic opinion in the US, South Korea and Japan is not in favour of concessions.
Strategically, the North Korean threat provides justification for Japan and South Korea to strengthen their defence capabilities, while bolstering their alliance ties with the US in a manner that directly undermines China's regional security priorities. South Korea has only recently reached agreement with the US to extend the reach of its ballistic missiles from 300 to 800km to counter the North Korean threat, and following the latest test, Seoul has suggested that it will step up the pace of this programme. Similarly, public opinion in Seoul is increasingly sympathetic to the notion that a nuclear North Korea justifies South Korea acquiring similar technology.
In Japan, the conservative Abe administration is committed to increasing its defence budget, relaxing its postwar ban on participating in collective security initiatives and enhancing missile defence collaboration with the US that boosts Japan's military preparedness against both North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile capabilities. At a time when the Sino-Japanese territorial standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands is pushing China and Japan into an increasingly adversarial relationship, China has every reason to attempt to lower the regional and strategic temperature.
The problem for Beijing is that its actual leverage over North Korea remains limited. In 2003, China temporarily suspended oil shipments to North Korea in response to Pyongyang's missile test of that year, but to do so now might risk creating too much instability in North Korea. South Korea's foreign minister has urged his Chinese counterpart to do more to pressure the North, but the more decisive prompting may come from the US.
This may explain why senior US officials, including defence secretary Leon Panetta, have been highlighting the new strategic threat that North Korea's nuclear test and its enhanced ballistic missile capabilities poses to the US and the wider international community. If the new, pragmatic leadership of Xi Jinping judges that Washington is minded to act more decisively against North Korea, whether politically or perhaps militarily, then the argument in favour of action becomes stronger. The next few days will be critical as Beijing weighs up its options, but for now the likelihood is that China will chose cautious diplomatic hedging rather than decisive action against its errant North Korean ally. Reported by guardian.co.uk 2 days ago.
North Korea's dramatic and provocative announcement of its third nuclear test on 12 February has raised critical questions about the effectiveness of the international community in reining in north-east Asia's most unruly actor. The key player in persuading North Korea to adopt a more moderate course of action is China. As a longstanding political and strategic ally and a provider of substantial amounts of energy and food assistance, and given its geographical proximity, Beijing has the means and increasingly the incentive to put pressure on Pyongyang to row back from its belligerent posture.
Judging from Beijing's critical rhetorical response to this week's events, China's leaders appear minded to get tough with North Korea. China's foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, quickly announced that his government was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed to the test", and took a symbolically important step in calling in the North Korean ambassador to China to underline this message. Beijing was also careful to identify itself with a UN security council statement that "strongly condemned" the nuclear test.
There is little doubt that irritation in China at the provocations from its Korean neighbour has been increasing – not only in government circles, but also among academic commentators and within wider social media and online communities. But it remains unclear whether Beijing is willing to reinforce its rhetoric by imposing significant pain on the North Korean leadership.
Militating against action is the Chinese leadership's fear of instability: the desire not to destabilise the fledgling regime of Kim Jong-un for fear that this might provoke a North Korean collapse, triggering an exodus of refugees across China's 800-mile border; creating a power vacuum that could be filled by South Korea and its American ally; and posing a proximate strategic challenge to China's security.
Inaction, however, has real risks. If Beijing pulls its punches, it undermines its credibility internationally as a "responsible stakeholder" able to mediate constructively. For now, China has called for "calm and restraint" and suggested that the six-party talks be reactivated as a means of restarting negotiations with North Korea. But this proposal appears impractical at a time when domestic opinion in the US, South Korea and Japan is not in favour of concessions.
Strategically, the North Korean threat provides justification for Japan and South Korea to strengthen their defence capabilities, while bolstering their alliance ties with the US in a manner that directly undermines China's regional security priorities. South Korea has only recently reached agreement with the US to extend the reach of its ballistic missiles from 300 to 800km to counter the North Korean threat, and following the latest test, Seoul has suggested that it will step up the pace of this programme. Similarly, public opinion in Seoul is increasingly sympathetic to the notion that a nuclear North Korea justifies South Korea acquiring similar technology.
In Japan, the conservative Abe administration is committed to increasing its defence budget, relaxing its postwar ban on participating in collective security initiatives and enhancing missile defence collaboration with the US that boosts Japan's military preparedness against both North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile capabilities. At a time when the Sino-Japanese territorial standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands is pushing China and Japan into an increasingly adversarial relationship, China has every reason to attempt to lower the regional and strategic temperature.
The problem for Beijing is that its actual leverage over North Korea remains limited. In 2003, China temporarily suspended oil shipments to North Korea in response to Pyongyang's missile test of that year, but to do so now might risk creating too much instability in North Korea. South Korea's foreign minister has urged his Chinese counterpart to do more to pressure the North, but the more decisive prompting may come from the US.
This may explain why senior US officials, including defence secretary Leon Panetta, have been highlighting the new strategic threat that North Korea's nuclear test and its enhanced ballistic missile capabilities poses to the US and the wider international community. If the new, pragmatic leadership of Xi Jinping judges that Washington is minded to act more decisively against North Korea, whether politically or perhaps militarily, then the argument in favour of action becomes stronger. The next few days will be critical as Beijing weighs up its options, but for now the likelihood is that China will chose cautious diplomatic hedging rather than decisive action against its errant North Korean ally. Reported by guardian.co.uk 2 days ago.